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In 1965 we are ninety years removed from the date of Owen J.
Roberts' birth in Philadelphia in 1875. In 1875 he was only seventy-
five years removed from the close of the decade 1790-1800 when
Philadelphia was the capital of the country. As a child nurtured in
the heart of the early United States, he must have known elders not
far removed from the American Revolution. He lived long enough
in the twentieth century to know revolutionary changes throughout
the world and the portents of more to come. His devotion to the
University of Pennsylvania Law School bespeaks his sense of the
need for the law to develop as rationally as possible to give reasonable
order to the churning times.
In this notably moonstruck century lawyers still give the appear-
ance of being solidly grounded. Who else could so persuasively sug-
gest how free from moonshine they are as they document argument
with mundane detail in the light of the midday sun? Who but these
unhappy few would be so deadly serious even when they romantically
personify their profession as a "Jealous Mistress?" Who but the
learned brethren would join in lute songs to her forbidding ancestry
* This article was presented orally as the Owen J. Roberts Memorial Lecture,
delivered November 12, 1964, under the auspices of the Pennsylvania Chapter of the
Order of the Coif and the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
t Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court. A.B. 1923, Ph.D., J.D. 1927,
University of California.
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and commanding virtues? Who but the lawyers would set aside Law
Days to pledge her their love and their overtime?
For all our sober allegiance, however, we do hardly better than
anyone else to see straight the object of our devotion. Clearly she
is a venerable image and one of substantial worth. She can at times
be of dazzling beauty. She has the beguiling class of age, the patina
of many ages, the appearance of one who will survive us all. It is
easy to overlook that an idol of such irreproachable clay evinces some
frailties when she spirits herself away from her noble base to become
a spectral wanderer. In any direction in space or time, she can
wander at will. She haunts the obscure trails marked out by ancient
pilgrims, where landmarks are sometimes engulfed in rubble, and
their eroded inscriptions can be said to mean anything.' She haunts
freeways where modern pilgrims speed endlessly whenever they are
not stalled, and she is known for compounding the confusion of any
collision with lunatic instructions.' She frequently takes off on
byways that many a poor pilgrim has never discovered, or has come
upon to his woe.
None of us can ever know all that there is to know about her.
Nonetheless there is cause to know that whenever she is at large she
is not always so kempt as she should be. We fail her as well as
ourselves if we fail to direct questions at her now and again when
we are within shouting distance. Should we not call her to account
for at least her unguarded affairs of wide and disturbing import?
There is one area on which we are fairly knowledgeable. We
know the ways of the law in the appellate court, not merely because
they are amply reported, but because they are amply and critically re-
viewed. Scholars inspect the output of the appellate process as if it
were dynamite, and they comment exhaustively on innocuous defects
as well as on patent dangers. There are law journals enough to train
searchlights upon the courts everywhere in the land, and they are
quick to note the errant ways of appellate decision from the most
righteous sentimentalism to the most wrongheaded standpattism.
Hence an appellate opinion must pass muster with scholars as well as
with practitioners "on the alert to note any misunderstanding of the
'See Traynor, Badlands in an Appellate Judge's Realm of Reason, 7 UTAH L.
Rxv. 157 (1960).2 See Werkmnan v. Howard Zink Corp., 97 Cal. App. 2d 418, 428-31, 218 P.2d 43,
49-52 (Dist. Ct. App. 1950); FRANx, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 181-85 (1949);
Cunningham, Instructing Juries, 32 CAL. S.B.J. 127 (1957) ; Traynor, Fact Skepticism
and the Judicial Process, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 635, 637 (1958); Wiehl, Instructing a
Jury in Washington, 36 WAsH. L. Rzv. 378 (1961); Winslow, The Instruction Ritual,
13 HASTINGs L.J. 456 (1962); 1959 Institute for California Judges-Panel Discussion
Part III: Instructing the Jury, 47 CALIF. L. REv. 888 (1959) ; Note, Standard Jury
Instructions, 98 U. PA. L. Rxv. 223 (1949).
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problem, any error in reasoning, any irrelevance in data, any over-
sight of relevant data, any premature cartography beyond the problem
at hand."'
There is no way of measuring the effect of constant law review
critiques on the appellate process. Nevertheless, the increasing refer-
ence to them in opinions and briefs indicates that they are carrying
increasing weight with judges and lawyers alike. It is no modern
judge who still prides himself on some obscurely stated rapport with
the reported authorities that in his mind render other learning ex-
pendable. It is no modern lawyer who still disdains the critiques,
content to rest easy in hard cases with the undemonstrative Shepards
of the what-has-been, with all that has been indiscriminately stuffed
into the overstuffed concept called authority. There is a pall on the
once formidable Confr6rie de Chevaliers Pontificaux in the practicing
bar given to heeding and speaking no preachments other than what
they have practiced.
The fact that it is no longer deemed pedantic, let alone eccentric,
for a judge or a lawyer to be caught red-eyed with a law journal
evinces rising standards of learning in the profession. Improvements
in judicial administration, though far from universal, have encouraged
the hope of our saying in time that at least with regard to judicial
procedure the law is a zealous housekeeper. Lest we gild the lily-toil-
lately prematurely, however, we do well to remember that even in
the most ceremonial of her many domains the force of inertia con-
tinues to operate against good housekeeping. For all the scholarly vigil
that fosters a relatively well-kept judicial domain, the overall order is
marred by large patches of unkemptness. There are still all too many
lawyers as well as judges so habituated to the dust-laden air amid
creaking gates and accumulated debris as to be insensitive to the
need for wholesome renovation.
Moreover, we have yet to resolve the still troubling question that
regards not the jealous mistress, who can comport herself tolerably
well in court, but what we might describe as the extrinsic bawd. The
extrinsic bawd still demands of too many judges in too many states
that irrespective of their qualifications they prove themselves popular
not only in one popular election but even thereafter in office to minimize
the risks of elections to come.4 There are well-qualified men who
will not enter the lists of such a contest, knowing that they must either
compromise the very qualities that make a good judge, notably a dis-
3 Traynor, Comment, in LEGAL INSwTIUTIONS TODAY AND ToMoRoW 48, 52 (1959).
4See Rosenman, A Better Way To Select Judges, 48 J. Am. JuD. Soe, 86,
88-89 (1964).
1965]
488 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
passionate unconcern with popular fads and fancies, or risk losing the
contest to the fad-and-fancy candidate. By luck the populace some-
times gets better than one might expect, or by luck an unlikely choice
proves in time worthy of office. But it is no easy matter for such
dignitaries that the extrinsic bawd sits on the courthouse steps, biding
her time till the next election and promising her favors to whichever
ogler is willing to do her bidding. Pessimists have cause to query
what profit it the mistress to appear majestic in court if the bawd
selects custodians given to excessive indulgence in the currying of
popular or powerful favor.
One can respond to the pessimists that all is not lost where so
many watchbirds are counteracting the omnipresence of the bawd. At
least the appellate judge, whose opinions are not only relentlessly re-
viewed by scholarly critics, but also critically read by an increasing
number of well-educated lawyers, comes to find in the very existence
of this alert audience some reassurance of the independence of his
office no less than of its responsibility.
The welcome watchbirds of the appellate courts have yet to watch
as intently the central domains of the legislatures and the multitudinous
strongholds of administrative boards and of private groups who in
their own recesses exercise power over their constituents not unlike
that of a state.5
Why not? What distinguishes these other areas of the law from
judicial law that they have escaped vigil as relentless as that on the
courts? How has it come about that the journals quick to break out in
a swift-rising chorus of woe over the pox on any salient judicial
opinion make no such vehement outcry over many an equally poxy
nonjudicial dictate that roughens the course of law?
So large an inquiry calls for a series of responses on the various
aspects of nonjudicial law to yield the benefits of all points of view.
Each is likely to be partial, in the dual sense of one-sided, whatever its
range of objectivity, insofar as it conveys the perspective of a par-
ticular vantage point. Thus, with relation to the legislative process
alone, to say nothing of such a giant spin-off as administrative law,
some commentators are advantageously situated to inquire into its
origins and evolution, others to focus upon what it produces, and still
others to note in detail how effectively it functions. My own re-
flections, in the nature of preliminary observations rather than final
judgments, will confine themselves to the different standards of vigil-
ance for appellate courts and for legislatures, to some indications of
5 See Traynor, Better Days in Court for a New Day's Problems, 17 VAND. L.
REV. 109, 118-21 (1964).
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rising standards of legislation despite inadequate vigilance, and par-
ticularly to the import of statutes that determine or influence the
course of judicial procedure and administration.
Given the long predominant role of the judiciary in the develop-
ment of the law, it is understandable that traditional critics preoccupied
themselves with what had been wrought by the established. primary
developers. Once thus preoccupied, many never gained full sight of
the law that other developers were up to or down to. Even within
recent years, when new critics have sought to make up for this over-
sight, they have had the aspect of parvenus in the critical journals.
These new reporters of long unguarded affairs are gaining space,6 but
they are still far from parity with the orthodox critics who rally only
to a run on the courthouse.
Yet there have been far-reaching changes in the panorama of the
law, quite apart from its steady enlargement. Once upon a time, now
long ago, the courthouses were in the foreground, legislatures were in
the background, and an occasional administrative board sat on the out-
skirts, devoted to such lackadaisical activities as the receipt of stamp
taxes and the disbursement of stamps. The judges worked at their
carpentry on the common law, embellishing or disfiguring it according
to their talent for construction or botch. The legislators usually
hearkened if enough people or the right people said there ought to be
a law, and periodically they tapped out a code. The administrators
went about their stamp activities with such circumspection that no
one ever felt impelled to declare that the time had come for another
tea break of rock-and-roll proportions. It was conducive to this way
of life in the law that so many people lived in the country.
Few foresaw how many would soon live in the city, and even
now few have seized all the import of the change. A prescient observer
might have foretold that courthouses would no longer dominate the
legal panorama, that legislatures would advance from the background,
and that administrative boards would divide and multiply until they
were a sight to make sore eyes sorer. The high-rise laws of the legis-
latures presently towered over the landscape, though with the eventual
effect of accentuating rather than effacing the uniqueness and dura-
bility of the carpentered cottages of the common law. 7
It is of course a glaring trick on perception that the common
law now appears relatively smaller than before. Actually common
law too is growing apace, even if not so spectacularly. Among other
things, judges are called upon to interpret all manner of statutes and
6 See, e.g., Fonn.m, THE STATF LEoisLTSw INsTrrUTiow 49 (1959).
7Id. at 17.
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to fit more and more pieces of statutory law into the continuity script
of the common law. There are no reliable formulas for such a job;
it is necessarily creative. In any event we do not measure the sig-
nificance of law by dimension or bulk; nor should we imagine com-
petition between two processes of lawmaking that are in fact correlative.
If human aspiration is infinite, then so is the law, and so are the forms
it can take.
I would not labor these observations were it not that they lead
us to tangential light on our inquiry into the double standard of
vigil. That double standard is fostered, perhaps inadvertently, by a
dwindling but still highly vocal group who view with alarm any con-
tinuing development of the common law. In the mental graveyard of
this set, the law is set forth in two kinds of tablets with no correlation
between them. There are statutory tablets, of flexible material, cut to
order in all sizes and shapes, from the skimpy to the outlandish. Legis-
lators thus appear as normally creative, revising or liquidating their
tablets as they see fit. In supposed antithesis are common-law stone
tablets of mysterious origin that have always been where they are,
complete with slots in which a judge deposits his question to receive
in return the applicable rule of law, preferably no more than one. In
this view, though judges resort to legerdeplume to create an illusion
of kinship between burned-out coals of ancient sapience and the electric
eels of unprecedented problems, they do not now nor did they ever
create law. Before the judges the stone tablets were, presumably,
concealed in the bushes.
It is mechanical in the extreme thus to deny the creative element
in the judicial development of the law, merely because judges keep
their dispassionate distance from the centers where new laws are in-
novated. Nevertheless, the stone-tablet cohorts still spread the gospel
that judicial law alone is autonomous and moreover possessed of such
pearly lore that it must be jealously guarded as is no other law. The
vigil they keep on judicial law is one less of criticism than of upraised
pitchforks against evolution. What they place on a pedestal, call it a
woman or call it the law, they guard not from love of reason but
from fatuous attachment to the familiar. Even when time has patently
bereaved their idols of virtue, they would still oppose demolition except
by the legislature.' Even when their idols were devoid of virtue from
the outset, they would preclude courts from undoing well what they
have done badly. Though they do not seriously detract from the
scrutinizing rounds of true courthouse critics, they unfortunately help
to divert attention from all that goes on elsewhere. Among scholars
8 See People v. Pierce, 395 P.2d 893, 895, 40 Cal. Rptr. 845, 847 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
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one tends to underestimate, if not to forget, how influential the die-
hards still are.
The relative weakness of the vigil that both true critics and un-
critical vigilantes keep on other fronts may be in part attributable also
to the popular image that lawmakers outside the courts are repre-
sentatives of their public rather than of the law per se. The corollary
is that whatever laws they make are in sincere response to public
sentiment, and hence need not be tested for wisdom unless their very
constitutionality is in issue. Does it follow that though they may howl
with madness, we should let howling dogs by? If their rampages
evoke criticism, should it be so diluted with tolerance as to be ineffec-
tive? If a mad bill is about to become law, should critics not at least
sound the alarm? If a mad law is abroad in the land, should we not
at least issue regular bulletins as to where it appears to be heading? Is
there not more reason than ever to do so when it has no tether of
tradition to keep it within reasonable bounds? Is it not a wild non
sequitur that if a law has no tie with the past, its future is none of
our business?
It becomes more than ever our business now that legislatures are
the predominant lawmakers even in traditional areas of the common
law. Whatever the variation in their personnel and resources, they
are situated, as courts are not, to initiate comprehensive laws on
massive problems and to revise them in the light of new data. It falls
to them to take the lead in providing growth and diversification in the
law to keep pace with the growth and diversification of public or
private or mixed enterprise. Thus it is as normal for a code to carry
a pocket supplement as it would be beyond bounds for a judicial de-
cision to do so. The statute is the current installment of a never-
ending story. The decision is by definition decisive, the closing
chapter of a controversy. For better or worse it plays its bit part in
the common law in its first and only edition.
In sum the legislators are the plant managers of the law, free to
roam and see for themselves what the public needs, and free to produce
accordingly in plants sometimes well-equipped with research and
development staffs and well-geared for production. Their twofold
freedom would seem conducive to the most rational lawmaking. In
contrast judges are confined to working indoors exclusively and con-
fined to the problems of those who have sought them out with proper
credentials. Indoors they stay, preoccupied with the record, riddled
though the record may be with the complications and confusion of
long and often bitter quarrel. Their twofold constriction would not
seem favorable for the most rational lawmaking.
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Nevertheless, the traditions of judicial office that operate against
external pressures serve to render the judicial process signally rational
in spite of its constrictions. Conversely, the vulnerability of legis-
lative office to external pressures and the stubborn survival of caliph
committee structures in too many areas work against the seemingly
rational processes of lawmaking available to legislators.9 Hence con-
stant vigil becomes imperative.
Given a close watch on the scene of legislation, legislative offices
could develop traditions of independence and even of active cooperation
with legal centers of known objective scholarship. After all, the
traditions of independence in judicial office, nurtured today in an
environment of scholarship and tending to take hold of even popularly
elected judges, followed a heyday of untidy backfireside justice in the
so-called Jacksonian era of the judiciary, when scholarship and inde-
pendence suffered concurrent depreciation. It is not surprising that
both now thrive because of stern vigil."0 A comparable vigil on the
legislative process could in time give the lie to the cynical aphorism
that it is easier to legislate than to litigate.
There are many good men in our legislatures, and many lawyers
among them, who would welcome such a vigil. Of course the legis-
lative process would continue to involve constant adjustment of con-
flicting interests, but there is every reason to arrive at such adjust-
ments in the light of objective studies and objective criticism.
An effective watch upon the legislative process requires more than
the vigilant law journals that scrutinize the documented and readily
available accounts rendered of the judicial process. We have not yet
mustered all the resources even of such journals, however, in the
needed vigil, though more and more they are taking the initiative to
serve as constructive critics of legislative law." They can do much to
counteract the fitful ways of the legislative process. Its feats of clumsi-
ness have been vividly set forth by Judge Friendly, who laments that
"the legislator has diminished the role of the judge by occupying vast
fields and then has failed to keep them ploughed." 12 Certainly courts
9 See, e.g., GRiFFrH, CONGRESS-ITS CONTEMPORARY ROLE (3d ed. 1961) ; GRoss,
THE LEGISLATIVE STRUGGLE (1953); WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT (1885).
10 See Traynor, To the Right Honorable Law Reviews, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 3
(1962).
11 See, e.g., Traynor, Comment, in LEGAL IN TiTuTioNs TODAY AND TOMORROW
48, 66 (1959); Packer & Gampell, Therapeutic Abortion: A Problem in Law and
Medicine, 11 STAN. L. REV. 417 (1959) ; Legislation, 17 VAND. L. REV. 325, 638, 1354
(1963-1964) ; Legislation, 16 VAND. L. REV. 1261 (1963) ; Project, Legislative Regu-
lation of Retail Installment Financing, 7 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 618 (1960) ; Survey of 1949
Ohio Legislation, 10 OHIO ST. L.J. 413 (1949).
12 Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking-Judges Who Can't and Legislators Who
Won't, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 787, 792 (1963).
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are helpless to stay the maddening sequences of triumphal entry and
sit-in.13 What is frustration to them, however, can be challenge to
the scholars. Steeped in special knowledge of one field or another, they
can well place their knowledge at the service of legislatures for the
plowing of the fields, for their sowing and their care. "Who but the
scholars have the freedom as well as the nurturing intellectual environ-
ment to differentiate the good growth from the rubbish and to mark
for rejection the diseased anachronism, the toadstool formula, the scrub
of pompous phrases ?" 14
There is a tragic waste in the failure to correlate all our machinery
for vigil to maximum advantage. Is it not time to break the force of
habits that militate against steady communication between legislators
in unplowed fields and scholarly watchbirds in bleachers? It is for no
more sinister reason than lethargy that we have failed in large
measure to correlate the natural resources of legislators who have an
ear to the ground for the preemption of new fields and of scholars who
have an eye on their long-range development. Perhaps we can make
a beginning by calling upon legislators to take the initiative in estab-
lishing permanent lines of communication. The scholars can hardly
take that initiative, for they are not lobbyists. 5 Why not invite their
ideas through the good offices of a legislative committee that can
insure their careful consideration? Why not, particularly when some
legislatures are now equipped with permanent legislative aids,'" and
13 See Riesenfeld, California Legislation Curbing Deficiency Judgments, 48 CALIF.
L. REv. 705, 728 (1960) ; Traynor, No Magic Words Could Do It Justice, 49 CALIF.
L. REv. 615, 628 (1961). See also Salsbery v. Ritter, 48 Cal. 2d 1, 9-14, 306 P.2d
897, 901-04 (1957).
14 Traynor, Law and Social Change in a Democratic Society, 1956 U. IL.. L.F.
220, 233.
15Professor Dunham, in commenting on the law revision group projects at the
University of Chicago Law School, notes that such participation need not involve
advocacy, for "we can successfully immunize ourselves from a role which we should
not assume-that of promoting the passage of any legislation drafted." The Law
School Record, University of Chicago, Fall 1955, pp. 4-5.
16 In summary form the major aids are:
Law Revision Commissions: Only California (1953) and New York (1934) have
such a commission.
Legislative Counsel Bureaus: California (1913), Georgia (1959), Nevada (1945),
and Oregon (1953) have a "legislative counsel" by that title. Twenty-four additional
states have a variety of officers or agencies that appear to perform some of the
functions of the California Legislative Counsel.
Legislative Councils: Forty-two states have official bodies entitled "legislative
council," or an equivalent title. In a number of instances these councils or their staffs
perform some of the legislative service functions of a legislative counsel.
Judicial Councils: Thirty-three states have a judicial council. In an additional
nine states there is a judicial conference that performs a similar function. In several
of these latter states, the judicial conference succeeded a prior judicial council.
Bureaus of Public Affairs: There are fifty-four universities located in thirty-nine
states that have institutes of governmental studies or bureaus of public affairs.
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here and there law schools have now set up legal centers, and there
remains only to set up permanent lines of communication between them?
The following table sets forth such aids in each state and the dates of their
establishment:
Legis-
lative
Council b
1945
Judicial
Council
1959
Bureau
of Public
Affairs d
University of Ala-
bama (1939)
1953 Arizona State Uni-
versity (1959)
1947 1941 University of Ar-
kansas (1957)
1926 University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley
(1920) ; Davis
(1935) ; L.A.
(1937)
San Diego State
College (1957)
1953 1958 University of Colo-
rado (1960)
1937 1927 University of Con-
necticut (1944)
1955
1953 University of
Florida (1947);
Florida State Uni-
versity (1947)
Office of
Legislative
Counsel (1959)
Revisor of
Statutes (1959)
Legislative
Reference
Bureau (1913)
1959 1945
1955
1963 Judicial Con-
ference (1951)
1937 Judicial Con-
ference (1957)
University of Idaho
(1959)"
University of Chi-
cago (1954) ; Uni-
versity of- Illinois
(1947) ; North-
western University
(1953) ; Southern
Illinois University
(1951)
Law
Revision
Con-
mission
Legislative
Counsel
Bureau a
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Committee on
Statute Revi-
sion (1951)
Legislative
Research
Department
(1947)
Legislative
Reference
Bureau (1945)
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
[Vol.l13:485
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The natural agency for such communication is a law revision
commission such as now exists in New York and California. A state
that muddles along without one needlessly muddles along on donkey-
power when horsepower is readily available.
Legislative
Counsel
Bureau a
Legislative
Bureau (1907)
Revisor of
Statutes (1929)
State Law
Institute
(1938)
Department of
Legislative
Reference
(1916)
Legislative
Service Bu-
reau (1941)
Revisor of
Statutes (1939)
Revisor of
Statutes (1944)
Legis-
lative Judicial
Council b Council
1945 1935-1953;
1960
1955 1959; Judicial
Conference
(1959)
Bureau
of Public
Affairs d
Indiana University
(1937)
State University of
Iowa (1949)
1933 1927 University of Kan-
sas (1909); Uni-
versity of Wichita
(1958)
1936 1928 University of Ken-
tucky (1937)
1952 1950 Louisiana State
University (1936)
1939 1932 Bowdoin College
(1914)
1939 Judicial Con- University of
ference (1945) Maryland (1947)
1954 1924 Boston University
(1947) ; Harvard
University (1911) ;
University of Mas-
sachusetts (1956)
1964 1929-1955; Michigan State
Judicial Con- University (1957);
ference (1954) University of
Michigan (1914)
1947 1937 University of Min-
nesota (1913)
University of Mis-
sissippi (1945)
1943 Judicial Con- University of Mis-
ference (1943) souri (1957) ; Park
College (1955)
1957 Montana State
University (1956)
Revisor of 1937
Statutes (1945)
1945 1945 University of Ne-
vada (1959)
Law
Revisiton
Co -
inission
Indiana
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
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One could begin in every state with an inventory of needed or
neglected aids that could be utilized both to improve and to expedite
legislative lawmaking. One could appraise to what extent they have
done so. Thus a 1951 tabulation in my state begins by defining the
Law
Revision Legislative
Corn- Counsel
mission a Bureau a
New Hampshire Office of
Legislative
Service (1963)
Legis-
lative
Council '
1951
Judicial
Council
1945
Bureau
of Public
Aff airs d
University of New
Hampshire (1953)
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York 1934
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Law Revision
and Legislative
Services Com-
mission (1954)
1954 1930-1950; Princeton Univer-
Judicial Con- sity (1935) ; Rut-
ference (1948) gers University
(1950)
1951 1954 University of New
Mexico (1945)
1934-1955;
Judicial Con-
ference (1955)
1963 1949
1945 1927
1943 1923
1939 1943
Legislative
Counsel Com-
mittee (1953)
Legislative
Reference
Bureau (1909)
University of
North Carolina
(1920)
University of Okla-
homa (1920)
1955 University of Ore-
gon (1933)
1937 Judicial Con-
ference (1928)
Pennsylvania State
University (1959) ;
University of Penn-
sylvania (1937);
University of
Pittsburgh (1944)
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Code Commis-
sioner (1954)
Revisor of
Statutes (1951)
Code Commis-
sion (1953)
Texas
1939 1927-1935;
1939
1949 1956 University of
South Carolina
(1945)
1951 1933 State University of
South Dakota
(1939)
1953 1943 University of Ten-
nesse (1945)
1949 1929 University of
Texas (1913)
[Vol.l13:485
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functions of such legislative aids as programming, research, bill draft-
ing, and revision, and it notes the growing interest of legislators in
such aids. Even in 1951 California was not lacking in aids, but the
inventory-taker noted that "of the four legislative aid functions, bill
drafting, provided by the Legislative Counsel Bureau [established in
1913] seems to be the only one adequately covered." 17
The California Code Commission, established in 1929, was mainly
concerned with "organizing and restating the present statutory law
... ) I's The Law and Legislative Reference Section of the Cali-
fornia State Library was at the passive service of active legislators.
The California Bureau of Public Administration, established in 1935
at the University of California at Berkeley, prepared factual reports
upon demand, but what bore noting was "inadequate liaison with
the legislature and the absence of legislative control over the
research . ." '"
Law
Revision Legislative Legis- Bureau
Corn- Counsel lative Judicial of Public
mnission, a Bureau a Council ' Council C Affairs d
Utah 1947 1931 University of
Utah (1947)
Vermont Statutory Re- 1945
vision Commis-
sion (1957)
Virginia Code Commis- 1936 1928 University of Vir-
sion (1948) ginia (1931)
Washington Statute Law 1947 1925 University of
Committee Washington (1934)
(1951)
West Virginia 1933 West Virginia
University (1949)
Wisconsin Statutory Re- 1947 1951 University of Wis-
vision Bureau consin (1948)
(1909)
Wyoming Statute Re- 1959
vision Com-
mission (1959)
a Source: 15 THE BooK OF THE STATES 1964-1965, at 74-83 (1964).
b Source: 15 THE BooK OF THE STATES 1964-1965, at 74-86 (1964).
c Source: Institute of Judicial Administration, State Judicial Councils, Judicial Con-
ferences, Court Administrators and Related Organizations, March 15, 1961.
d Source: DIRECTORY OF UNIR'SITY RESEARcH BUREAUS AND INSTITUTES (1960).
17 Note, Legislatures and Legislators: Statutes: California Legislative Aids, 39
CA.n'. L. Rxv. 288, 291 (1951).
18 Id. at 289.
19 Id. at 291.
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It was not until 1953 that the California Law Revision Com-
mission was established, with headquarters at Stanford University,
following the example of the New York Law Revision Commission,
established in 1934, with headquarters at Cornell University. Its 1964
report lists fifty-seven bills and two proposed constitutional amend-
ments that it drafted and presented to the legislature. Thirty-nine of
the bills were enacted, as well as one constitutional amendment. Since
1953 it has engendered massive statutory revision in such fields as
arbitration and claim procedures in actions against public entities.
20
Many problems stand in need of just such massive solution.
Though they cry for attention, they may nevertheless be neglected in-
definitely, often enough because they originated as common-law prob-
lems and were purportedly laid at rest by judicial decision. If a court
at last abandons an unsound or outworn rule, forthrightly setting forth
the painstaking analysis that such a renunciation demands, l it may
trigger the massive action on the legislative front necessary to resolve
the problem in comprehensive fashion. Thus, when the California
Supreme Court renounced the doctrine of sovereign immunity in
1961, ' it triggered a comprehensive study of the doctrine by the law
revision commission. That study became the basis of statutory law 2
governing various ramifications of a problem that had cast many
shadows beforehand and that could hardly be resolved in so large a
context within the confines of judicial decision, except by costly liti-
gation over a long span of time.
The California Law Revision Commission has also proposed a
code of evidence for the consideration of the Conference of California
judges and of the state bar before presentation to the legislature.2 4  In
20See 4 CAL. LAW RmSION COMM. REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND STUDIES
208 nn.6-11 (1963). The arbitration statute, Cal. Stats. 1961, ch. 461, was based upon
3 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM. REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND STUDIES G-1 to -64
(1961). The revision of the claims procedures, Cal. Stats. 1959, chs. 1724-28 (repealed
by 2 Cal. Stats. 1963, ch. 1715, § 6, at 3395), was based upon 2 CAL. LAW REVISION
COMM. REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND STUDIES A-1 to -128 (1959).
21 See Morris, Liability for Pain and Suffering, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 476, 483-85
(1959) ; Traynor, La Rude Vita, La Dolce Giustiaia; or Hard Cases Can Make
Good Law, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 223, 232 (1962).
2 2 M uskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr.
89 (1961); see Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School Dist, 55 Cal. 2d 224, 359
P.2d 465, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1961); 3 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §25.01
(Supp. 1963); Traynor, La Rude Vita, La Dolce Giustizia; or Hard Cases Can
Make Good Law, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 223, 230-31 (1962) ; Van Alstyne, Governmental
Tort Liability: Judicial Lawmaking in a Statutory Milieu, 15 STAN. L. REv. 163
(1963) ; Van Alstyne, Goveinmental Tort Liability: A Public Policy Prospectus,
10 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 463 (1963).
23The revision of the statutes governing sovereign immunity, 2 Cal. Stats. 1963,
chs. 1681-86, 1715, 2029, was based upon 4 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM. REPORTS,
RECOMMENDATIONS, AND STUDIES 801-1611 (1963) and 5 CAL. LAW REVISIoN CoMm.
REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND STUDIES 565 (1963).
24 See 4 CAL. LAW REvIsIoN CoMm. REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND STUDIES
301-619 (1963); CAL. LAw REVISION COMM. TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATION AND A
STUDY RELATING TO T31E UNIFORM RULES OF EVmENCE (1964).
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1965 the legislature, with the benefit of both scholarly research and
the comment of judges and lawyers, will be in a fair way to modernize
the law of evidence.
In our affluent country there is every reason to establish a law
revision commission in each of the forty-eight states that is without
one. A legal center situated within the purview of a law school could
afford an ideal environment for such a commission. It could there
devote itself wholeheartedly to the formulation and drafting of statutes
as well as to continuing re-examination of their fitness for survival.
It could withstand the prevailing winds of pressure groups as it made
timely use of the abundant wasting assets of scholarly studies. One
can hardly imagine interchange more valuable for the law than that
between those entrusted to review it critically and those entrusted to
draft proposals for its revision. On a wide front they could collaborate
in long-range studies of legal needs that would richly complement the
applied research that legislatures recurringly ask of their legislative
aids. In turn the work of the commissions would offer hearty sus-
tenance not only to the law reviews but to all the other projects of a
law school, not the least of which is the classroom. Such permanent
relationships between law schools and law revision commissions, going
far beyond today's ad hoc partnerships, would strengthen their benef-
icent influence on legislation.
In fostering communication between legislators and law schools,
a law revision commission is bound to become alert to local aspects
of those problems that lend themselves to resolution by uniform laws
such as are proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws. It can undertake the double responsibility
of expediting enactment of a uniform law when it is well adapted to
the local scene or of suggesting local adaptations when they seem
necessary. A proposed uniform law is usually designed to raise
local standards, but a law revision commission can nonetheless be on
the alert for any provision that would lower them. There should be no
slackening of the vigil on the jealous mistress when she turns up in a
uniform. What still counts is her intrinsic virtue and how well she
is put together.
A law revision commission could likewise scrutinize the restate-
ments of the American Law Institute, as well as its proposed model
acts, for possible local adoption or adaptation. It could study to good
purpose the proposals of the Institute of Legal Research of the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law School and the Institute of Judicial
Administration at New York University. Certainly it should also keep
informed, if only to avoid wasteful duplication, of the growing output
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of the American Bar Foundation and the American Judicature Society.
Above all it should watch all proposals in law journals for legislative
action. A quick check revealed that the law reviews in my own state
published a total of well over two hundred such proposals since 1950.
A similar check in Pennsylvania revealed almost one hundred
proposals for law reform in a single law review in the past eight years,
and a statewide total approximately equal to that in California since
1950. It is a fair guess that few of them have made their way to the
desks of the legislators for even cursory appraisal.
A law revision commission has within easy reach this wealth of
usable material. Indeed, the growing embarrassment of all these
riches is that they often fail to produce steady interest, let alone a
capital gain. There is no sorrier sight than a slatternly mistress
shambling in unkempt raiment amid endless bolts of rich material that
are hers for the asking and kicking aside even tailored garments that
she could freely alter to meet her measurements. No one expects her
to look as beatific in action as in a clay image, but without great effort
she could look reasonably neat and smart.
Now and again it may be appropriate to supplement the work
of law revision commissions with projects entrusted to a special task
force. Thus the California Joint Legislative Committee for Revision
of the Penal Code has entrusted to a group of law professors assisted
by an advisory board of judges and lawyers a three-year study directed
toward a substantive code, a code of criminal procedure, and a cor-
rections code.5
The growing disposition of legislators to make use of such ob-
jective studies in my state improves the coherence and continuity of
statutory law. Since legislation, or the lack of it, now mainly deter-
mines the course of judicial administration and procedure, a judge is
impelled to take special interest in any aids that can improve statutory
law in this area. It is a neglected area in which the jealous mistress
has cast one of her dizziest spells. Scholars have now and again de-
scribed the blight in rousing terms, 25 but in the main to no great avail.
252 Cal. Stats. 1963, ch. 1797.
26 A notable example is the work of the Columbia University Project for Effective
Justice, organized in 1956, in the field of judicial procedure. Among their major
studies are: Rosenberg, Critique of Methods Used To Expedite Litigation, in 11 N.J.
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 1 (1959); Franklin, Chanin & Mark, Accidents, Money, and
the Law: A Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Litigation, 61 COLUm. L. REV.
1 (1961); Rosenberg & Chanin, Auditors in Massachusetts as Antidotes for Delayed
Civil Courts, 110 U. PA. L. Rav. 27 (1961); Rosenberg & Schubin, Trial by Law-
yer: Compulsory Arbitration of Snmll Claims in Pennsylvania, 74 HARv. L. REV.
448 (1961) ; Rosenberg & Sovern, Delay and the Dynamics of Personal Injury Liti-
gation, 59 COLUm. L. REv. 1115 (1959) ; Rosenberg, Sanctions To Effectuate Pretrial
Discovery, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 480 (1958). See also HOLBROOK, A SURVEY OF METRO-
PoLiTAN TRIAL COURTS, Los ANGELES AREA (1956); LEviN & WOOLLEY, DISPATCH
AND DELAY: A FiELD STUDY OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION IN PENNSYLVANIA (1961);
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Perhaps blight persists in this area because of its undramatic nature.
One is not likely to come upon villains who despoil it, such as could
stir crusaders to action. It encompasses no extraordinary resources,
such as could stir the imaginative to exploration. It offers no sensa-
tional material for headlines. One can hardly imagine the average
household reaching a pitch of righteous indignation over some crazed
law on practice or procedure that in its quiet way does no more than
obstruct justice daily.
Though the American Judicature Society reports notable reforms
within the last decade and strong support for more,27 what remains to
be done still looms larger by far than what has been done. In my
own state the filaments of all too many cobwebbed statutes still enmesh
court procedures, even those of modern aspect.s In Professor Geoffrey
Hazard's apt summary of the madness in California: "Those who
would deal with California procedure, therefore, must be not merely
historians but archeologists, alert to detect in the foundations of a
modern case or statute the shards of an older procedural culture." 29
One might add that only fond lawyers would be tolerant of a mistress
so indiscriminately all things to all men.
SCHULmAN, TowARD JUDICIAL REFORM IN PENNSYLVANIA (1962); ZEISEL, KALVEN
& BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURT (1959); Kalven, The Bar, the Court, and the
Delay, 328 Annals 37 (1960) ; Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury
Damage Award, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 158 (1958).
27 See Winters, The National Movement To Improve the Administration of
Justice, 48 J. Am. Jum. Soc'y 17, 19-21 (1964).
28For example, there are fifty-six sections of the California Code of Ciil Pro-
cedure, CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE §§ 420-75, relating to pleadings, as against nine rules in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, FED. R. Civ. P. 7-15. They constitute a petrified
forest dating back to 1872.
Federal Judge Charles E. Clark, in reviewing CHADBoURNE, GROSSMAN & VAN
ALSTYNE, CALIFORNIA PLEADING (1961), commented: "As yet [California's] . . .
only essay into the most modern reform of the federal rules appears to be the adoption
of some of the party joinder rules in 1927, the rule for summary judgments as
amended in 1953, and the discovery rules in 1958." Clark, Book Review, 8 U.C.
L.A.L. REv. 994 (1961). In contrast there has been notable progress in some of the
other states.
2 Hazard, Book Review, 8 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1012, 1013 (1961) (reviewing
CHADBOURNE, GROSSMAN & VAN ALSTYNE, CALIFORNIA PLEADING (1961)). In Pro-
fessor Hazard's vivid context:
California procedure is difficult, finally, because in no jurisdiction's procedural
structure, except perhaps that of New York, is there such an incongruous
coexistence of the ancient and the modern in procedural rule and policy. In
some states, such as Oregon, the old Field Code lives on in undisturbed
slumber. In others, such as Washington, Arizona and New Mexico, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been adopted root and branch and
most of the old learning cast out. But in California, we have at one and the
same time the old special demurrer and the new modern interrogatory to a
party, both usable for the purpose of eliciting a detailed statement of position
from the opposing party. We have at one and the same time maximum
latitude for joinder of parties plaintiff and niggling and annoying limitations
on counter-claims. There are dozens of other illustrations.
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The extraordinary melange of sense and nonsense in my own
state affords enough of an object lesson to prompt a brief inquiry into
how the hodgepodge originated, why the nonsense came to survive,
and what the prospects are of bringing it to a hightimely end.
Consider for a moment a history that is not likely to repeat itself.
Envisage a mountainous country overlooking the Pacific Ocean where
Spanish-speaking missionaries were establishing communication with
Indians on the cultivation of the land at a time when their contempo-
raries in Philadelphia were working furiously on their Anglo-Saxon
law books. This far country became a state in 1850 amid a gold rush
hardly conducive to scholarly deliberation on judicial procedure. An
immediate task of the pioneer society was to create a judicial system
overnight against a background of Spanish and Mexican law. There
was restlessness in the pioneers over the formalism in the common
law. So it came about that the twig was bent toward codification in
the Field Codes of 1872, though these were fertile with common law.
Minute details of judicial procedure were embedded into statutes, and
additions and amendments in bits and pieces rendered these statutes
in time as strange in design as a coral reef and stranger still in their
juxtaposition of skeletal and living substance.
Into this submarine life California in 1879 launched one of the
heaviest constitutions ever to stay afloat. For all its ponderosity it
starts off buoyantly, setting forth as inalienable the right not merely
to pursue but to obtain safety and happiness.3" Apparently the pioneer
framers themselves felt neither secure nor happy about lawmakers, for
they conceived a mass of restrictions on both the legislature and the
courts.
No one constrained by such fetters lives with them happily ever
after. A change for the better came for the courts in 1926 when a
constitutional amendment provided for a judicial council under the
chairmanship of the chief justice."'
The judicial council's responsibility is akin to that of a law re-
vision commission in the limited field of practice and procedure. The
California constitution directs it to "adopt or amend rules of practice
and procedure for the several courts . . . . " The hitch is that
they must be consistent "with laws that are now or that may hereafter
be in force . . . . " That is a hitch of some consequence in view
of the myriad laws in force. Though the council has adopted many
S CAL. CONST. art I, § 1.
31 CAL. CONST. art VI, § la.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
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rules that merely supplement statutes, the prospects of establishing a
new rule are often likely to depend upon the liquidation of an en-
trenched statute. Still, a statute no longer has quite the formidable
advantage of an incumbent, for the constitution directs the judicial
council to "submit to the Legislature, at each regular session thereof,
its recommendations with reference to amendments of, or changes in,
existing laws relating to practice and procedure." "
Thus the judicial council is well situated to give the impetus to
change, and it has done so in limited areas, although it has not under-
taken any wholesale renovation. In 1943, pursuant to a delegation of
power from the legislature, it promulgated comprehensive rules govern-
ing appellate practice and procedure,35 which replaced conflicting
statutes that were accordingly repealed. Hence California now has
modern appellate procedures that are regularly kept up-to-date under
the council's broad power to make adjustments when the need arises.
The advantage of flexible adjustment over statutory fetters is strik-
ingly illustrated by the contrast between the well-kept appellate pro-
cedures in California and the unkempt trial procedures that have yet
to be released from the mess of statutes that control them.
Such unkemptness looms particularly large in view of the re-
habilitation in the procedures of administrative boards effectuated by
the judicial council, acting upon authority of the legislature. Its
studies led to the Administrative Procedure Act " which established
uniform rules of practice and procedure of statewide statutory agencies
in issuing, suspending, and revoking professional and business licenses
and similar rights or privileges. Upon the council's recommendation
the legislature provided for a division of administrative procedures en-
trusted with the continuing study of all aspects of administrative law
and procedure.
The judicial council also acted upon a grant of authority from the
legislature to draft a reorganization plan for the lower courts. It
culminated in a constitutional amendment in 195037 that opened the
way to reducing the number of lower courts from 768 to less than 400 38
and replaced eight types of courts, some with overlapping jurisdiction,
34Ibid.
35 See Witkin, New California Rules on Appeal (pts. 1-2), 17 So. CAL. L. REv.
79, 232 (1944). See also CAL.. JUDiCIAL COUNCIL TENTH BIENNIAT, REP. Pt. 1, at 6
(1944).
36 CAY.. Gov'r CODE §§ 11500-28; see CAL. JuimcaAI COUNCIL ELEVENTH BIENNIAL
REP. pt. 1, at 11 (1946); CAL.JuDICIAL COUNCIL TENTH BiENIAL REP. pt. 2, at 8
(1944) ; Kleps, Report on the Reform of Administrative Procedure, 20 CAL. S.B.J.
124 (1945).
3  CAL. CoNsT. art. VI, §§ 1, 11. See generally CAL. JUDICIAL COUNCIL TwErLTH
BiENNIAL REP. pt. 1, at 13 (1948).
38 See CAL. JUDICIAL CouNcIL FOURTEENTH BIENNIAL REt. pt. 1, at 16 (1953).
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by two, municipal courts and justice courts. As part of this reform, lay
candidates for judge of the justice court are required to pass a qualify-
ing examination given by the judicial council.39
One of the most interesting achievements of the judicial council
was the groundwork it laid for a constitutional amendment in 1960 4
establishing a commission on judicial qualifications. This commission
affords a means not only for retiring judges with incapacitating dis-
abilities, but also for removing judges for misconduct in office. The
unregenerate who occasionally turns up in any walk of life presents
a problem that requires careful handling, for a bad man is as hard to
lose as a good man is hard to find. The policing of its own ranks by
the judiciary is already proving an effective way of resolving the
problem.4
Until recently we had yet to deal with another problem of no
less delicacy, though it involved only words and not deeds. "If we
are in earnest about the rational growth of the law, we are bound to
be concerned with the form and content of opinions. Do we submerge
ourselves and the profession in wild seas of paper only to exhaust
ourselves in swimming out therefrom to be resubmerged?" ' In
1963 43 the California Legislature, acting upon a recommendation of
the judicial council, took a step toward flood control by repealing a
long-standing statutory requirement that all appellate court opinions
be published. Though all must still be given in writing,44 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court this year adopted a rule limiting the publication
of opinions by district courts of appeal to those deemed of value as
precedents by whatever court issues them.45 There has been a drop
in publication of over forty percent, and as yet no lawyers have been
heard to complain that they feel deprived in their reading.
In 1955 the legislature delegated power to the judicial council to
work out rules of pretrial procedure. 6 The task involves the resolu-
tion of questions as controversial as they are complex, and the council
has been painstakingly evolving and adjusting rules on the basis of
experience. Enough experience has accumulated for a consolidation
of gains toward a beneficent evolution of pretrial procedure. Whatever
39 CAL. GOv'T CODE § 71601.
40 CAL. CONST. art. VI, §§ lb, 10b.
41 See Frankel, Removal of Judges: California Tackles an Old Problem, 49
A.B.A.J. 166 (1963).
42 Traynor, Some Open Questions on the Work of State Appellate Courts, 24
U. CmI. L. Rnv. 211, 212 (1957).
43 CAL. GOVT CODE § 68895.
44 CAL. CoNsT. art. VI, §§ 2, 24.
45 CAL. Sup. CT. R. 976.
46 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 575 (Supp. 1964).
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emotional resistance survives of those who are set in old ways and
unduly suspicious of change should be dissipated in good season by
such an evolution.
In other recent delegations of authority to the judicial council, the
legislature has left it free to formulate and revise rules under which
district courts of appeal review decisions of the appellate departments
of the superior court,47 and superior courts review certain decisions of
the municipal courts and justice courts.4"
The California experience is of interest in the debate among
experts as to whether the power to make rules of practice and pro-
cedure should rest exclusively with the courts. Dean Wigmore ad-
vanced one view in an article summarized in the simple declarative
sentence of its title: "All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure
Are Void Constitutionally." " Dean Pound supported this view in
his report on "Procedure Under Rules of Court in New Jersey." 50
Chief Justice Vanderbilt of New Jersey also supported this view,51 and
it has been adopted in his state. 2
The contrary view is persuasively stated by Professors Levin and
Amsterdam of the University of Pennsylvania Law School. Rejecting
an either-or solution of judicial rulemaking that would compel a choice
between legislatures and courts, they state:
There is a middle scheme that holds out all of the advantages
of judicial autonomy while severely minimizing its collateral
4 7CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §988t (Supp. 1964); CAL. PFN. CODE § 1471 (Supp.
1964).
48 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 117j, 988j (Supp. 1964).
49 23 ILL. L. REv. 276 (1928).
5 66 HARv. L. REv. 28 (1952). See also Address by Dean Pound, California
Bar Association Seventh Annual Convention, Aug. 18, 1916, in PROCEEDINGS SEVENTH
ANNUAL CONVENTION, CALIFORNIA BAR ASSOCIATION 86, 112 (1916); id. at 163.
5 1 VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 111 (1949);
see Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making: A Prob-
lem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 24-26 (1958).
5 N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 2, para. 3; Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 74 A.2d
406, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950); see Kaplan and Greene, The Legislature's
Relation to Judicial Rule-Making: An Appraisal of Winberry v. Salisbury, 65 HARv.
L. REV. 234 (1951). The Michigan Supreme Court and the Florida Supreme Court
apparently also have power to make rules of practice and procedure that are not
subject to legislative veto or control. MICH. CONsT. art. VII, § 5; FLA. CONST. art V,
§ 3; Joiner & Miller, Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule
Making, 55 MICH. L. REV. 623 (1957). The Michigan Supreme Court recently
adopted a completely new set of court rules that are designated as the General Court
Rules of 1963. See Honigman, Procedural Changes in Michigan, 31 F.R.D. 113
(1962). In Florida, when the judicial council came into existence in 1953, it listed
as one of its major goals the vesting of full rule making power in the supreme court.
This objective was realized by a 1956 constitutional amendment. FLA. CONST. art. V,
§ 3. Thereafter, the legislature formally subordinated existing conflicting statutory
rules to the court-made rules. An interesting postscript is that a bill was introduced
to abolish the judicial council. The bill was defeated and the council was permitted
to survive but was denied any appropriation. Institute of Judicial Administration,
Rule Making Power of the Courts, 1962, p. 4.
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dangers. This is the scheme of concurrent jurisdiction:
granting to the courts full authority of initiative self-
regulation, reserving to the legislature an ultimate voice to
curb abuse."B
Levin and Amsterdam have presented this view so lucidly in
their well-documented article as to engender the hope that it will enlist
the interest of many readers in legislatures and courts. There is
occasion here only for brief comment on their observation that the
California Judicial Council "appears rather an advisory panel to the
legislature than an independent power . . . . " The characterization
is accurate, but it is encouraging to note not only that the legislature
has made significant delegations of power to the judicial council, but
that it has been so receptive to the council's recommendations as to
indicate that there will be like delegations of power whenever the
council is ready for them.
In discussing the good, bad, and indifferent ways of the law, I
have referred in the main to my own state only because of my
familiarity with it. In any event local references from one state may
serve to evoke comparable notes from other states."' It is a fair
speculation that anywhere in the land we could well intensify our vigil
on all aspects of the law.
M Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 51, at 36.
64 Id. at 7 n.36.
65 Certainly the sister state of New York has a related problem of statutory
fetters. In 1912 the New York Board of Consolidation was moved to comment:
The system of regulating details of practice by statutory rules is open to
the objections that statutory rules are: (1) subject to distortion by inex-
perienced legislators and (2) to amendments to suit individual cases; (3)
they bind the courts to rigid rules, (4) conduce to contests over minor points
of practice, (5) clog the courts with technical questions of statutory cor-
struction, and (6) place the responsibility for the administration of justice
upon the courts while giving control over it to the legislature.
N.Y. BD. oF STATUTORY CONSOLIDATION, PLAN FOR THE SIMPLIFICATION OF THE CIVIL
PRAcrIcE IN THE COURTS OF THE STATE app. 30 (1912).
New York is still in fetters, though there has been some recent mitigation of
statutory constraints. The judicial reorganization of 1962 in New York is designed
to reform civil procedure. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, chs. 308-18. Some 2,000 sections
of the old Civil Practice Act and Rules of Civil Practice have been reduced to about
600 sections in the new Civil Practice Law and Rules. N.Y. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
EIGHTH ANN. REP. 27 (1963). Procedural statutes adopted thereunder by the legis-
lature will be continuously coordinated with the rules adopted by the New York
Judicial Conference. Rules proposed by the judicial conference must be reported
to the legislature before February 1st of each year to become operative on the follow-
ing July 1st, if not disapproved by the legislature. The statutes and rules are organized
in such a way that a single publication will provide a unified statement of the regu-
lations governing procedure. The legislature, after consultation with the New York
Judicial Conference, determines whether a particular matter should be governed by
statute or rule. N.Y. ADVIsoRY COMM. ON PRA TICE AND PROCEDUPE, FINAL REPORT
A-109 to -117 (1961). See also N.Y. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE NINTH ANN. REP. 13-18
(1964); N.Y. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE EIGHTH ANN. REP. 26-35 (1963).
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I am mindful in closing that any proposal for a new look at the
familiar, particularly one that might lead to a new look in the familiar,
is bound to run up against chronic defeatism and sloth and timidity.
The defeatists rationalize their own defection from responsibility on
the premise that the good old days were as bad as ours, and that we
need not bestir ourselves to mend our ways so long as they are merely
going from bad to bad. The sloths would not rouse themselves even
to such rationalization. The timid may wish to get rid of the bad,
but are fearful of any involvement. It would be less than noble to
take refuge in such company..
These plain words have been no lute song, but in their way they
bespeak constancy to a great lady, even when she is less than her best.
She has more than once given us cause to remember that she can live
up to her part magnificently when she knows all eyes are upon her.
